Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 | 
 enlarge | Author: Steve Coll
Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics)
Category: Book
List Price: $18.00
Buy Used: $5.99
You Save: $12.01 (67%)
New (42) from $10.30
Avg. Customer Rating:  140 reviews
Sales Rank: 2105
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 738
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.4
Dimensions (in): 8.4 x 5.5 x 1.7
ISBN: 0143034669
Dewey Decimal Number: 958.1045
EAN: 9780143034667
ASIN: 0143034669
Publication Date: December 28, 2004
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Shipping: Expedited shipping available
Shipping: International shipping available
Condition: With pride from Motor City. All books guaranteed. Best Service, best prices.
|
| Also Available In:
|
| Similar Items:
|
| Editorial Reviews:
Amazon.com Review
Steve Coll's Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 offers revealing details of the CIA's involvement in the evolution of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the years before the September 11 attacks. From the beginning, Coll shows how the CIA's on-again, off-again engagement with Afghanistan after the end of the Soviet war left officials at Langley with inadequate resources and intelligence to appreciate the emerging power of the Taliban. He also demonstrates how Afghanistan became a deadly playing field for international politics where Soviet, Pakistani, and U.S. agents armed and trained a succession of warring factions. At the same time, the book, though opinionated, is not solely a critique of the agency. Coll balances accounts of CIA failures with the success stories, like the capture of Mir Amal Kasi. Coll, managing editor for the Washington Post, covered Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992. He demonstrates unprecedented access to records of White House meetings and to formerly classified material, and his command of Saudi, Pakistani, and Afghani politics is impressive. He also provides a seeming insider's perspective on personalities like George Tenet, William Casey, and anti-terrorism czar, Richard Clarke ("who seemed to wield enormous power precisely because hardly anyone knew who he was or what exactly he did for a living"). Coll manages to weave his research into a narrative that sometimes has the feel of a Tom Clancy novel yet never crosses into excess. While comprehensive, Coll's book may be hard going for those looking for a direct account of the events leading to the 9-11 attacks. The CIA's 1998 engagement with bin Laden as a target for capture begins a full two-thirds of the way into Ghost Wars, only after a lengthy march through developments during the Carter, Reagan, and early Clinton Presidencies. But this is not a critique of Coll's efforts; just a warning that some stamina is required to keep up. Ghost Wars is a complex study of intelligence operations and an invaluable resource for those seeking a nuanced understanding of how a small band of extremists rose to inflict incalculable damage on American soil. --Patrick O'Kelley
Product Description
The explosive first-hand account of Americas secret history in Afghanistan
With the publication of Ghost Wars, Steve Coll became not only a Pulitzer Prize winner, but also the expert on the rise of the Taliban, the emergence of Bin Laden, and the secret efforts by CIA officers and their agents to capture or kill Bin Laden in Afghanistan after 1998.
|
| Customer Reviews: Read 135 more reviews...
 Highly Informative, Not Well-Constructed, and Unfortunately Biased August 31, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
I recommend this book, in spite of its flaws, because it is a very useful history of CIA involvement in Afghanistan, from the end of the Carter administration until the day before the 9/11 attacks.
The book is divided into three parts, focusing on the Soviet occupation and mujahideen resistance, the Afghan Civil War, and the Taliban era, respectively. Coll commands a truly impressive list of source-interviews, and has clearly devoted considerable research time and effort. I suspect that few authors indeed could have had access to all of his information. If you can read the book through the end, it will be worth it.
But there are a few problems, which are significant:
1. The narrative tends to jump around in terms of geography and chronology. To some extent this is a necessary evil; in order to understand Afghanistan over the past three decades, one must understand Soviet/Russian, Iranian, Pakistani, Saudi and American involvement, because modern Afghanistan did not happen in a nutshell. And in order to understand those nations' involvement, one must know something of their history, and the personalities which drove decision-making. Unfortunately, Coll does not quite manage to pull everything together in a clear, readable narrative. The book can be slow-going, especially if you are new to the Middle East and Central Asia.
2. Coll very obviously doesn't care much for Republicans, and goes to some lengths to defend Democrats (without completely absolving them of responsibility). This is odd, given that the vast majority of the post-Soviet/pre-9/11 era happened under Democrat watch. Perhaps this is due in part to Coll's access to sources: it appears from his endnotes that he relies heavily on Clinton's administration for information, which is precisely the group with the greatest incentive to white-wash their actions. If most of the people you talk to are liberals, you will end up with a liberal version of history -- it's understandable, but regrettable.
3. The book has extremely little focus on Iran, and few details on the 9/11 hijackings. If you are interested in information on these aspects of Afghanistan, look elsewhere.
Again, I do recommend the book, which is valuable for its strengths in spite of its weaknesses. But the reader is advised caution, and might do well to start with a general history of Afghanistan or the Middle East before picking up Coll's book.
 Fascinating and well-researched history August 20, 2008
Though Osama Bin Laden became a household name after the 9-11 attacks, few people know the background of Afghanistan and the mujahideen fighters that birthed these radical groups. This book gives a well-researched, in-depth look into the interplay of the Cold War, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the radical groups that have made Afghanistan such a key region in the modern world. Though not a quick read, I would recommend it to anyone looking for more information beyond the 10-second sound bytes and action movie blather that our politicians give us when talking about the Middle East.
The writing is succinct and clear, no small accomplishment considering the breadth of this book and the many players. Keeping track of the many American, Persian, Arabic, etc names may feel daunting at first, but Coll consistently reminds the reader who these people are, so you won't feel lost. This is a big help if you're only able to read for pleasure intermittently like myself. The endnotes are evidence of the incredible amount of research that went into this book. Curious about some of the facts, I researched some of these endnotes, and they all checked out.
All in all, an excellent book that does more than try to pass the blame to one administration or department. Read it in conjunction with the books recommended by other reviewers to get a fuller picture of the Middle East.
A well edited reality show August 5, 2008
It was a pleasure reading this very well written and researched book. As an Indian, I grew up reading about the defeat of Russians in newspapers. The subsequent battle for Afghanistan between the communist government and the mujahedin entered my consciousness through snatches of news on the radio. So, it was great to get the stories and personalities around people like Masooud.
However, as I reached to the end of the book, I realized that clearly the author was not telling the whole story. Some gaping holes in the book are
1. CIA and the US government remained unaware of Pakistan support to Taliban for a long period. Did they not have sources in the ISI and Pakistan government?
2. Ditto for Saudi support to Taliban.
3. The Israeli agency Mossad is mentioned once in passing in the book. It is difficult to believe that they did not have any intelligence presence in a region which was developing as big threat to their existence. it is difficult to believe that they were a player of no significance in the whole story.
Now, there may be very good reasons for such omissions. However, they left me feeling that the book finally depends on revelations that were very tightly controlled. Obviously there would be control to protect the integrity of sources. But only slightly less obviously, the control can be used to "paint a picture." If you reveal only selected facts, most intelligent readers would draw the conclusions you want them to. I don't know what all has been left out. All I know is that the omissions pointed out above are too significant for me. They make me feel that I am watching a well edited reality show.
bordering on fraudulent August 5, 2008
0 out of 2 found this review helpful
well, not this book actually, but a related book by Coll's colleague Parag Khanna titled The Second World.
Some of the various, and numerous, factual errors that riddle the book are relatively trivial, but suggest serious sloppiness and disregard for getting facts right. For example, Yugoslavia was not part of Warsaw pact, as Khanna states. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was appointed to office in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin, and not by Vladimir Putin. Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are not all smaller by population than Manhattan, and the death toll from the civil wars in former Yugoslavia was not greater than half a million. Other obviously wrong assertions seem to be made up simply to provide lurid background color to Khanna's travelogue: the former KGB headquarters in Moscow has not been turned into "a high-class disco," expensive Moscow malls do not charge entrance fees, and police road checkpoints in Uzbekistan do not stop and check all vehicles. And other gross misstatements of fact display a simple complete lack of understanding the history and culture of the countries of which he writes: the (Orthodox) Uspenky cave monastery in Crimea is not representative of Ukraine's "proud Catholic heritage," Zoran Djindjic was not the first democratically elected leader since World War II in former Yugoslavia , and in the 1980s Yugoslav republics like Bosnia and Macedonia were not richer than Spain. Many of Khanna's wildly wrong claims sound like local myths that he has taken at face value. I can easily imagine some misguided elderly Belgrade resident waxing nostalgically for the days "when every one of our republics was richer than Spain!"
Yet more of Khanna's assertions are not merely factually wrong, but far exceed the ludicrous. In the fast paced and dangerous Russian business world, "one is safe only in the sauna, where everyone is naked and no weapons are allowed." It was news to me to learn from Khanna that every winter "waves" of Russians and "thousands of Ukrainians" freeze to death in "crumbling heatless apartment blocks." And he employs gross mischaracterizations of fact to buttress his claims. For example, according to Khanna, in 2006 Greek GDP increased 25% when the government started to account for prostitution and cigarette smuggling in its figures. In fact, the government said it would include all unreported economic activity, mostly in construction and trade, but including a "small" amount for illegal activities such as smuggling. And this is merely a sampling of patently ridiculous claims.
And for a "foreign policy whiz-kid," Khanna makes numerous and serious analytical mistakes, showing a clear misunderstanding of economics, international institutions, and international relations. The unhedged statement, "Russia's diplomatic position is purely residual," will surely surprise diplomats from Brussels to Tokyo. Noting that Gazprom's market capitalization is $300 billion leads Khanna to the conclusion that Gazprom is one third of the Russian economy, confusing market capitalization with GDP. And his bald assertion that "[n]one of Central Asian legal systems have evolved beyond Kakfaaesque" is belied by the numerous successful legislative accomplishments of Kazakhstan and its quite sophisticated legal code, for example.
But the worst moments of Khanna's book are when he quotes conversations that seem of such dubious authenticity as to make me believe they may be fabricated, or at best the result of very selective reporting, only relating those comments that fit within his pre-existing views. "'Our pride has suffered'" explains a "Moscow intellectual over a narrow glass of [of course] ice-chilled vodka, `but this only drives our nationalism further.'" In Kiev, the locals "give lifts to strangers for a token fare." Why? "We suffered enough together, so we still trust each other." There are just too many such (anonymous) quotations that fail to ring true to trust in the author's integrity. And he also reports statements by national leaders as if they were heard in personal conversation, yet in a curiously indirect fashion that suggests otherwise.
A Historical Tour de Force July 28, 2008
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
Wow! Never have I read such an engaging, informative book of such importance. If you want to understand Middle East politics, conflicts and major principals and how they were affected by American power read Ghost Wars. I found it refreshing to read a true journalistic account as dispassionate and unbiased as Steve Coll's brilliant book. His background information on Middle East history and the movers and shakers was perfect - not too long-winded or short-shifted. About as perfect an investigative non-fiction book can be.
|
|
|
